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IRCA'S ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS:
PROTECTIONS AGAINST HIRING DISCRIMINATION
IN PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
Employers who hire unauthorized aliens face strict penalties from
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). Recog-
nizing the potential for discrimination against authorized aliens
and United States citizens of minority national origin, IRCA also
provides an administrative procedure to handle these discrimina-
tion claims. This Comment examines how the current anti-
dicrimination protections of title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 can be
used to supplement the IRCA protections. The conclusion is that
IRCA, title VII, and section 1981 can interact to provide adequate
protection for those likely to be the target of discrimination.
INTRODUCTION
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has not been
able to control the flow of illegal aliens into this country. While some
are political refugees, many others are "economic refugees" lured by
the availability of jobs in the United States. Previous efforts, concen-
trated on patrolling the borders, were largely ineffective in stemming
the tide of illegal aliens.
Recently, President Reagan signed a hew bill into law that at-
tempts to attack this problem from a different perspective. Among
its provisions, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA)1 makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire unautho-
rized aliens, and establishes a procedure for employers to verify the
eligibility of applicants they hire to work. Employers who violate
IRCA's provisions are subject to civil penalties.'
During the long Congressional battle over IRCA, concern was ex-
pressed that some groups would suffer discrimination as a result of
1. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (1987) (codified in scattered titles and sections) [hereinafter IRCA].
2. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
its sanctions.3 To counter this concern, IRCA includes provisions
designed to protect legal aliens and citizens of national minority ori-
gin from discrimination.4 Employers who attempt to avoid sanctions
by refusing to hire those applicants who look or appear foreign run
the risk of fines and other penalties.'
These antidiscrimination provisions already are seen as unneces-
sary by some and confusing by others. Various congressmen have
referred to the antidiscrimination provision as "ill-advised" and "un-
necessary and over inclusive." Minority groups are concerned that
these provisions will not provide enough protection.7 Employers are
worried that their legitimate efforts to avoid sanctions will result in
lawsuits charging them with discrimination.' No one is exactly sure
how the provisions of IRCA will be enforced.
This Comment analyzes IRCA and its likely effects in providing
protection against hiring discrimination in the private sector. Ini-
tially, the Comment looks at IRCA's employer sanctions, surveys the
basic principles of employment hiring discrimination, and reviews
the past protections against race and national origin discrimination
- title VII and section 1981 - to determine the necessity of
IRCA's antidiscrimination provisions. The Comment then details the
legislative history of IRCA, as well as recent regulations and state-
ments promulgated by the Special Council in charge of enforcement,
the INS, and other government and non-governmental organizations.
Finally, the Comment examines the past and present protections
against citizenship and national origin discrimination, and concludes
that IRCA, title VII, and section 1981 can interact to provide ade-
quate protection for those likely to be the target of discrimination.
EMPLOYER SANCTIONS UNDER IRCA FOR HIRING ILLEGAL
ALIENS
The cornerstone of IRCA, and the key to its effectiveness in dis-
couraging the flow of illegal immigration is its employer sanctions.
There are three aspects of the sanctions that have ramifications on
the hiring process: (1) knowingly hiring an unauthorized alien; (2)
failing to fill out the required paperwork for any new person hired;
3. See H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 90, reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5694.
4. IRCA § 102(a), 100 Stat. at 3374-79 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (1986))
(also referred to as the Frank Amendment).
5. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
6. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 3, at 110, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 5714.
7. Immigration Law: When the Best Minds in Washington..., U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REP., Mar. 9, 1987, at 39.
8. Reeio & Neff, The Immigration Bill: Business Joins the Border Patrol, Bus.
WEEK, Oct. 27, 1986, at 41.
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and (3) continuing to employ an alien hired after November 6, 1986,
who is or has become unauthorized to continue working.
The first part of the statute reads, "It is unlawful for a person or
other entity to hire. . . for employment in the United States. . .an
alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien. . . ." Employers
who knowingly hire unauthorized aliens are subject to both civil and
criminal penalties. An employer can be fined between $250 to $2,000
per offense; a second offense carries a fine of between $2,000 to
$5,000 for each unauthorized alien; and a third offense carries a fine
of between $3,000 to $10,000 for each unauthorized alien.10 An em-
ployer who hires unauthorized aliens as a general practice faces pos-
sible criminal penalties of up to $3,000 per unauthorized alien hired
plus six months of jail time."' The statute also authorizes the grant-
ing of injunctions.' 2
The second aspect of the sanctions is the establishment of proce-
dures that employers must follow for each new worker hired. An em-
ployer must ask each newly-hired employee for documents proving
the employee's identity and authorization to work in the United
States. 3 The employer and employee are then required to fill out
and sign an 1-9 citizenship verification form within three days after
the employee begins working.' 4 These verification forms then must
be kept for all current employees and must be made available for the
INS to inspect upon demand. Failure to keep these records properly
can result in fines to the employer of $100 to $1,000 for each em-
ployee without the verification paperwork.' 5
IRCA requires the employer to inspect the documents offered by
the employee as proof that the employee is authorized to work in the
United States. 6 There has been concern that unauthorized aliens
9. IRCA § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3360 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a). Presum-
ably all employers not specifically exempted in the statute must fill out an 1-9 (citizen-
ship verification) form for any employee, including those "employers" who hire individu-
als for domestic work in their private homes on a regular basis. However, those hired-for
domestic work on a sporadic basis are not required to fill out an 1-9. See IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR EMPLOYERS, IN-
STRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING FORM 1-9, at 2 (May 1987) [hereinafter 1-9 HANDBOOK].
10. IRCA § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3366-67 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a).
11. Id., 100 Stat. at 3367-68.
12. Id., 100 Stat. at 3368.
13. Id., 100 Stat. at 3361-62.
14. 1-9 HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 2, 7. A new employee who cannot come up
with the necessary documents has this deadline extended to twenty-one days if he pro-
duces a receipt showing he has applied for the document. Id. at 8.
15. IRCA § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3367 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a).
16. Id., 100 Stat. at 3361.
will obtain "false identification." In fact, counterfeit document un-
derground already has sprung up in some major United States cit-
ies.1- Many employers, who have had no training or experience in
judging the authenticity of the identification, are concerned that they
could be fined if they hire persons whose identification seems genu-
ine, but turns out to be counterfeit. The new law states that employ-
ers need only verify that the documents appear to be genuine.18
While this language is vaguely reassuring to employers, it does not
establish an adequate standard of duty.19 For example, if an em-
ployer accepts a "green card" as authentic that is green in color in-
stead of (genuine) blue, is he held to a "reasonably informed em-
ployer" standard or to a different standard? And will an employer in
Maine who has had little contact with the various documents an au-
thorized alien might possess be held to a less strict standard than an
employer in California who has had a great deal of experience with
such documents?
The last practice that could subject the employer to fines is one of
continuing to employ an alien whose authorization has expired.20
Such an employer will be subject to the same schedule of fines and
presumably criminal penalties that it would if it knowingly had hired
an authorized alien.21 This places an additional burden on the em-
ployer. Not only must it screen each new hire for employment au-
thorization, it must also keep track of any authorization expiration
dates for any authorized aliens it hires. Further, some aliens whose
authorizations expire are still legally authorized to work if the reason
for expiration of authorization is due to delay on the part of the
INS.22
Each part of IRCA that discourages employers from hiring illegal
aliens also encourages employers to discriminate against persons who
might turn out to be illegal aliens. An employer who hires an appli-
cant of Hispanic origin runs some risk that the documents produced
by the applicant might be counterfeit. An employer who hires an
authorized alien has the additional burden of keeping track of the
employee's authorized status throughout the period of employment.
There will be increased pressure on employers to discriminate on the
17. See Stevenson, Hiring Aliens: The New Risks, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1987, at
Dl1, col. 2; DelVecchio & Garcia, Scam Artists Who Prey on Illegal Aliens, San Fran-
cisco Chron., Jan. 28, 1987, at 6, col. 2.
18. IRCA § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3361 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a).
19. The INS is training some employers to spot counterfeit documents, which
would indicate that employers will be held to a certain level of knowledge and expertise
in this area. See Hill, Phony Papers a Hot Item for Illegals, USA Today, Apr. 10, 1987,
at 3A, col. 2. Also, photocopies of the acceptable documents are given in 1-9 HANDBOOK,
supra note 9, at 12-17.
20. IRCA § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3359-60 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 11324a).
21. Id., 100 Stat. at 3366-67.
22. 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 52 (1987).
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basis of an applicant's national origin and/or citizenship.
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROVING EMPLOYMENT HIRING
DISCRIMINATION
The United States Supreme Court established the elements re-
quired to prove hiring discrimination in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green. 3 A plaintiff charging discrimination in the hiring process
must prove that (1) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he applied to
and was qualified for the job that the employer sought to fill; (3)
despite being qualified, his application was rejected; and (4) after
rejecting him, the position remained open and the employer contin-
ued to seek applications from persons of his qualifications.24 If the
applicant does so prove, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to
prove that the decision not to hire the applicant was not based on
improper criteria.2 5 If the employer offers a valid reason to explain
why the applicant was not hired, the burden then shifts back to the
applicant to prove the employer's explanation was a "pretext." 26
Courts have discussed two different groupings of discrimination:
disparate treatment and disparate impact. 7 Disparate treatment is
the more easily recognizable and provable of the two. Simply, mem-
bers of one race, national origin, or other group are treated differ-
ently from everyone else. An example of disparate treatment is
found in McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation Co. 28 In McDonald,
two white employees and one black employee were caught stealing.
The white employees were fired; however, the black employee was
not. The Court held, in effect, that employers cannot use different
standards to evaluate members of different racial, national origin, or
citizenship groups.2 9
In disparate impact cases, an employer uses one standard, but that
standard has a detrimental effect on one or some racial, national or
citizenship groups but not on others. Such devices as intelligence
tests,30 fluency tests,"l and even height and weight requirements 32
23. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
24. Id. at 802.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 805.
27. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
28. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
29. Id. at 290.
30. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
31. 2 EEOC COMPL. MAN. (BNA) § 623.9, at 623.0019 (Aug. 1984).
32. 2 EEOC, EEOC POLICY STATEMENT, RELATIONSHIP OF TITLE VII OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT TO THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986 (adopted
could be held to be unlawful discrimination, even if applied uni-
formly to all applicants. However, just because some of these devices
result in disparate impact does not mean that they are illegal. There
could be valid business reasons for requiring that applicants measure
up to some objective criteria. If the employer can show that the
screening device has a demonstrable relationship to successful per-
formance, and is a "Bona Fide Occupational Qualification"
(BFOQ), it is not guilty of unlawful discrimination. 3 If it cannot, it
is liable, even if it did not intend to discriminate against the racial,
national origin or citizenship group.34
Statistics have become increasingly important to prove discrimina-
tion. Most discrimination is not open and flagrant, and there often is
no evidence besides the plaintiff's testimony of his personal experi-
ence and the employer's denial that he or she discriminated. The
Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States 5 noted, "in many cases the only available avenue of proof is
the use of racial statistics to uncover clandestine and covert discrimi-
nation by the employer or union involved." '38
PROTECTIONS EXISTING PRIOR To IRCA
Before passage of IRCA, certain statutory protections existed that
purported to protect certain groups and classes against this type of
employment discrimination. The two main sources of protection, still
in force today, are 42 U.S.C. § 198 17 and title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.38 Both sources will be examined to determine
first, what remedies are available under each, and, second, to what
extent non-citizens and minorities of national origin are protected by
these statutory provisions.
Section 1981
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (section 1981) states: "All persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to. . . the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens. . .. "-9
Feb. 26, 1987), reprinted in 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 400, 402 (1987).
33. See generally 2 EEOC COMPL MAN. (BNA) § 625.1, at 625:0003 (Apr.
1982).
34. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
35. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
36. Id. at 339 n.20 (quoting United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544,
551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971)).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982); see infra text accompanying note 39.
38. Civil Rights Act of 1964, title VII, §§ 701-706 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e-17).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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Since the early 1970s, alleging a violation of this section has be-
come quite popular with plaintiffs, in part because it has fewer re-
strictions than title VII and allows a greater range of remedies.
Under section 1981, courts can award both equitable and legal reme-
dies including compensatory and punitive damages. 40 However, it is
not always more advantageous to pursue a section 1981 remedy. One
of the disadvantages of section 1981 compared to title VII is that the
former requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's discrimi-
nation was intentional. 1
Citizenship Discrimination
Whether section 1981 protects against discrimination based on cit-
izenship is not entirely settled. Following Guerra v. Manchester Ter-
minal Corp.,'2 it seemed clear that the court would consider pure
citizenship discrimination to be violative of this statute. In Guerra, a
legal alien from Mexico was transferred to a lesser job because of an
agreement between the employer and the union to reserve certain
types of jobs for United States citizens, or aliens, with family in the
United States, intending to become citizens. The worker who took
the plaintiff's former position was a Mexican national whose family
lived in the United States. The court held that this discrimination,
although ultimately determined to be between classes of noncitizens,
was based on an initial distinction between citizens and noncitizens.
This citizenship discrimination was held to violate section 198 1.43
Subsequent cases generally followed the Guerra holding. In Rami-
rez v. Sloss,44 a city's hiring procedures, which provided preference
to citizens, were held to violate section 198 1.45 In Thomas v. Roh-
ner-Gehrig & Co.," a recent action brought by United States citi-
zens against a Swiss-owned company, the plaintiffs sued on both title
VII and section 1981 grounds, alleging a hiring bias for Swiss and
German citizens. The court upheld the title VII change and dis-
missed the section 1981 charge with leave to amend, so that the
plaintiff could allege the defendants were all noncitizens and claim
40. See, e.g., Tafoya v. Adams, 612 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (D. Colo. 1985), aft'd,
816 F.2d 555 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 152 (1987).
41. See, e.g., Erebia v. Chrysler Plastix Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1257 (6th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1197 (1986).
42. 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
43. Id. at 655.
44. 615 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1980).
45. Id. at 169-70.
46. 582 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
that the plaintiffs were all citizens of the United States.4 7
Recent cases considering citizenship discrimination have cast con-
siderable doubt on the continued viability of section 1981 as a tool
against pure citizenship discrimination. This trend started with De
Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors.48 The
court analyzed the legislative history of section 1981 and determined
that it did not cover aliens. The court denied relief to a resident legal
alien who had been removed from a union hiring list because he
lacked United States citizenship. 9
In Bhandari v. First National Bank of Commerce,50 the most re-
cent case addressing citizenship discrimination, the Fifth Circuit al-
lowed a cause of action for such citizenship discrimination, explicitly
stating that if it had not been bound by the Guerra precedent, it
would have held otherwise.51 In Bhandari, the court analyzed the
legislative history and reached the same conclusion as the De Mal-
herbe court: discrimination based on citizenship was not meant to be
covered by section 1981. The court grudingly allowed the suit to con-
tinue, but made it clear that it thought the Guerra case was wrongly
decided.52
What future courts will do in this area is uncertain. One possibil-
ity seems most likely - courts may find that pure citizenship dis-
crimination is not covered by section 1981, absent of showing of dis-
crimination against noncitizens based on race. The likelihood of this
outcome is evidenced by the holding in Ben-Yakir v. Gaylinn Associ-
ates.5" In Ben-Yakir, an alien sued a former employer for a pay dis-
crepancy allegedly caused by his noncitizen status. The court denied
the claim and noted "this court has decided on several occasions that
claims under section 1981 that attack private acts must allege racial
discrimination."
54
Thus, an employer who refuses to hire all aliens regardless of legal
status, but who does not discriminate against any "race," might be
free from a section 1981 claim. However, an employer who inten-
tionally discriminates against noncitizens on the basis of race by, for
example, only checking the identification of those who appear His-
panic, and then refusing to hire any noncitizens, probably would be
liable under section 1981.
47. Id. at 672.
48. 438 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
49. Id. at 1142.
50. 808 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1987). Bhandari did not deal with employment dis-
crimination, but did deal with related issues, involving a person of Arab citizenship who
alleged he was denied a Visa credit card because he was a noncitizen.
51. Id. at 1099-1100.
52. Id. at 1105.
53. 535 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
54. Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
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A further possibility is that section 1981 may be expanded by
courts to include citizenship discrimination if the antidiscrimination
provision of section 102(a) of IRCA does not provide enough protec-
tion. 55 The history of the use of section 1981 in employment discrim-
ination cases shows that courts began to recognize it as a viable
claim in discrimination cases not covered by title VII.56 Rather than
dismiss discrimination claims not covered, courts could render some
relief to worthy plaintiffs by recognizing a section 1981 claim. The
Frank Amendment,57 like title VII, contains some strict and elabo-
rate procedural prerequisities and qualifications.58 If these result in
dismissal of otherwise valid claims by noncitizens, courts may be
willing to allow claims resurrected under section 1981. Courts could
justify this as following the severely criticized, but not overruled,
Guerra precedent.
National Origin Discrimination
Section 1981 does not cover discrimination based solely on na-
tional origin. Many courts have noted that national origin discrimi-
nation is addressed specifically by title VII, and that section 1981
does not specifically mention national origin.59
The language of section 1981 is vague when it comes to defining
protected individuals. "All persons . .. shall have the same right
...as is enjoyed by white citizens." 60 At the time of enactment, the
statute was designed primarily to protect blacks. In recent times, it
has been expanded to protect all "races." The Supreme Court, in
McDonald, set the tone for interpreting section 1981 to allow protec-
tion against any discrimination based on race, holding that section
1981 protected whites from such discrimination."'
The definition of the term "race" has evolved slowly through case
law in this area. Even early cases recognized that "race" should not
be defined literally, but should also protect groups that were per-
ceived to be a race and who had traditionally suffered from
55. IRCA § 274B, 100 Stat. at 3374 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b).
56. See, e.g., Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d at 655. See supra
notes 40-45 and accompanying text. In Guerra, the court pointed out that title VII did
not cover citizenship discrimination, but that section 1981 applied.
57. See supra note 4.
58. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Chaiffetz v. Robertson Research Holding, Ltd., 798 F.2d 731, 735
(5th Cir. 1986); Carillo v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 538 F. Supp. 793, 795 (N.D. II1. 1982).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
61. 427 U.S. at 296.
discrimination.62
Hispanics, the group most likely to need protection from discrimi-
nation resulting from IRCA sanctions, long have been recognized as
a group traditionally discriminated against and a group perceived by
the community as a "race." 63 Dismissal of suits brought by Hispan-
ics has occurred only when the plaintiff has alleged national origin
discrimination and failed to allege racial discrimination, or when
there was clearly no discrimination on the basis of race.64 If the com-
plaint alleges racial discrimination, courts generally allow the claim
to proceed under section 1981.65
The number of "races" protected by section 1981 has been grow-
ing steadily. Pakistanis6 and East Indians67 have qualified to pro-
ceed on a section 1981 claim. In the past, persons of Slavic, 8 Ukran-
ian,6 9 and American"° national origin have been held not to qualify
regardless of whether "racial" discrimination is alleged. However, in
two recent cases,7 ' the Supreme Court cast doubt on whether any
such group would be denied protection under section 1981 in the
future.7 12 The effectiveness of section 1981 as a weapon against na-
62. See, e.g., Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa.
1977). See also Ramos v. Flagship Int'l, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 400, 403
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), in which the court analogized the definition of "race" to that of "ob-
scenity," using the so-called "community contemporary standards concept." By this defi-
nition, a race is any national origin that is considered by the community to be a "race"
or traditionally has been discriminated against in that community.
63. Budinsky, 425 F. Supp. at 788.
64. See Vera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 448 F. Supp. 610 (M.D. Pa. 1978);
Apodaco v. General Electric Co., 445 F. Supp. 831 (D.N.M. 1978).
65. For an analysis of cases dealing with Hispanics as a race, see Ortiz v. Bank of
Am., 547 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Ortiz breaks down the cases dealing with this
issue into three different groupings: (1) courts that have denied recovery to Hispanics as
a race; (2) courts that have granted plaintiffs leave to amend their suits to allege the
discrimination was "racial" in character; and (3) courts that have allowed the claim to
proceed when Hispanic plaintiffs have alleged the discrimination was racial in character.
In Ortiz, the court noted the trend and logic of recognizing claims by Hispanics under
section 1981 and allowed the plaintiff's claim to continue even though he had failed to
allege explicitly that the discrimination was racial in character. Id. at 568.
66. Khawaja v. Wyatt, 494 F. Supp. 302 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
67. Banker v. Time Chem. Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. 111. 1983).
68. Budinsky, 425 F. Supp. 786.
69. Hiduchenko v. Minneapolis Medical & Diagnostic Ctr., 467 F. Supp. 103 (D.
Minn. 1979).
70. Chaiffetz, 798 F.2d 731.
71. Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987) (holding that
Arabs were protected under section 1981); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S.
Ct. 2019 (1987) (holding Jews were also protected).
72. The Court's test of whether a group qualifies as a race is whether Congress
intended to protect that group, not whether that group is considered to be a separate race
by today's standards. Shaare Tefila Corporation, 107 S. Ct. at 2022. The Court re-
viewed the legislative history of section 1981, which it traced back to the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and the Voting Rights Act of 1870. Many different ethic groups were dis-
cussed in the Congressional debates as races, including Scandanavians, Anglo-Saxons,
Latins, Jews, Gypsies and Germans. St. Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2027. By this
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tional origin discrimination may still depend on the complaintant's
race. Hispanics would seem to be covered as long as their complaints
allege racial discrimination. Persons belonging to less distinguishable
national origin/race groups, such as Italians, are probably also cov-
ered, but it is less clear. Overall, section 1981 would be very helpful
in augmenting the protection of IRCA. The groups most distinguish-
able and likely to be discriminated against are the groups most likely
to qualify as "races" under section 1981.
Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states: "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer. . . to fail or refuse
to hire ...any individual . ..because of such indiv: lual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . ...1 The remedies availa-
ble under title VII are limited. Successful plaintiffs can obtain only
injunctive relief, reinstatement, and up to two years of back pay.7'
Unlike section 1981, general and punitive damages are not availa-
ble.76 The prevailing party in a title VII suit is, however, entitled to
reasonable attorney fees.76 Title VII plaintiffs encounter an addi-
tional kind of limitation - title VII suits cannot be jury trials.
Title VII also imposes strict procedural limits on plaintiffs. Claims
must be filed with the state or local- employment commissioner or the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180
days of the alleged discrimination.78 The EEOC investigates and at-
tempts to negotiate a compromise; if that is not possible, it either
institutes an action in federal court or issues a "rights to sue" let-
ter.7 9 If the letter is issued, the plaintiff must file a suit in federal
court within ninety days.80
Citizenship Discrimination
Title VII does not explicitly protect against discrimination based
on citizenship, and courts generally have refused to extend its protec-
tion to discrimination on the basis of citizenship alone. In Espinoza
reasoning, all these groups would now qualify for protection under section 1981.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
74. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
75. See, e.g., Tafoya, 612 F. Supp. at 1098.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
77. See, e.g., Tafoya, 612 F. Supp. at 1099.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
79. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
80. Id.
v. Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc.,8 1 the Court denied relief to a law-
ful alien who had sued a company with a long-standing policy of not
hiring aliens. In its opinion, the Court stated "[a]liens are protected
from illegal discrimination under the Act but nothing in the Act
makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of citizenship or
alienage."82
Aliens can bring suit successfully under title VII on grounds of
discrimination on the basis of national origin. This distinction is il-
lustrated by the recent case of Vicedomini v. Alitalia Airlines,83 in
which an American of Italian descent brought a title VII suit, alleg-
ing that the employer discriminated against him in favor of Italian
natives. The court dismissed the suit because there was no difference
in national origin and, thus, there could not be national origin
discrimination.84
Thus, title VII could apply in cases of discrimination against legal
aliens resulting from IRCA. If an employer discriminated against
aliens of one national origin group but not against others, the aliens
of that national origin could recover on a title VII claim.8" On the
other hand, if the discrimination only affected aliens and not citizens
of the same national origin, title VII would not offer relief.
National Origin Discrimination
Title VII specifically prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of national origin. The term "national origin" has not been
taken literally to mean a person's nation of origin. It commonly
means the nation or identifiable geographic location from which
one's ancestors came.8 6 Most often, national origin discrimination oc-
curs when the complaining individual has noticeable characteristics
that clearly identify him or her as a member of a minority national
origin. These characteristics include such things as skin color,87 fa-
cial features, accent,88 and surname.89
Groups such as Hispanics and Orientals are easily recognizable as
distinct national origin groups, entitled to sue under title VII. Other
groups, such as people of slavic background, can bring national ori-
gin discrimination suits; however, they are far less likely to suc-
81. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
82. Id. at 95.
83. 37 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1381 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
84. Id. at 1383.
85. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. at 92-93 n.5.
86. See id. at 88.
87. Garcia v. Gardner's Nurseries, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 369 (D. Conn. 1984).
88. Mandhare v. LaFargue Elementary School, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1161 (E.D. La. 1985); Carino v. University of Okla., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
826 (10th Cir. 1984).
89. See Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979).
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ceed.90 One possible reason for this is that courts appear to be less
sympathetic and require more proof of national origin when the
claim involves groups who are not as clearly identifiable as "differ-
ent." '91 Another possible reason is that statistics are frequently kept
for clearly identifiable national origin groups like Hispanics, but are
infrequently kept for other smaller and less identifiable groups like
Slavs. 2
Title VII then can be a very effective weapon against the type of
discrimination most likely to result from IRCA sanctions. Employers
who treat applications of one national origin group differently from
others will violate title VII. Employers who choose not to hire mem-
bers of certain national origins, like Hispanics, to avoid hiring illegal
aliens, will be liable under title VII. Employers requiring identifica-
tion verification from applicants of some national origins but not
others also will violate title VII.
Less obvious forms of discrimination on the basis on national ori-
gin also are covered by title VII. Hiring procedures based on a test-
ing93 or fluency 94 requirements that have a disparate impact on indi-
viduals of certain national origins violate title VII, if such screening
requirements are not bona fide occupational qualifications
(BFOQs). 5 For example, an employer that requires applicants to
pass an English language competency examination in an effort to
eliminate illegal aliens from the hiring pool will be liable if compe-
tency in English is not necessary to perform the job.
THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS OF IRCA
Section 102(a) of IRCA, the Frank Amendment, prohibits dis-
crimination based on national origin or citizenship status:
It is an unfair immigration-related employment practice for a person or
other entity to discriminate against any individual (other than an unautho-
rized alien) with respect to the hiring . . . of the individual for employment
... (A) because of such individual's national origin, or (B) in the case of a
citizen or intending citizen ... because of such individual's citizenship
status.96
90. See, e.g., Sklenar v. Central Bd. of Educ., Detroit, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1396 (E.D. Mich. 1980). See generally Keotahian, National Origin Discrimina-
tion in Employment: Do Plaintiffs Ever Win?, 11 EMPL. REL. L.J. 467 (1985).
91. See, e.g., Hiduchenko, 467 F. Supp. at 106.
92. See, e.g., Sklenar, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1408.
93. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
94. 2 EEOC COMPL. MAN. (BNA) § 623.9, at 623:0019 (Aug. 1984).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
96. IRCA § 102(a), 100 Stat. at 3374 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b).
Like title VII, the Frank Amendment has some strict and narrow
statutory qualifications. It covers only discrimination by employers
with four or more employees,97 and it protects only citizens and
noncitizens who have filed declarations of intent to become citizens
and who are "on schedule" to becoming naturalized citizensY8 The
complicated procedural qualifications are a potential trap for the un-
wary. A plaintiff must file a claim with the Office of Special Counsel
within 180 days.99 The Special Counsel has 120 days after the claim
is filed to file a complaint with an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). 00 If the Office of Special Counsel fails to file or chooses not
to file within the. 120 days, the plaintiff may bring a private action in
front of the ALJ.1°1
The penalties possible under the Frank Amendment largely paral-
lel those of title VII. The ALJ may issue an injunction to force an
employer to stop the illegal practices;10 2 fine the employer up to
$1,000 per applicant discriminated against;103 and may further order
the employer to keep records on all applicants for positions to help
ensure that no further discrimination takes place.104
Plaintiffs are eligible for some remedies, but also may be subject
to potential liabilities associated with pursuing a claim. If successful,
a plaintiff can force the employer to hire or rehire him as well as
collect back pay for up to two years. 0 5 If the losing party's argu-
ment is without reasonable foundation in law or fact, the ALJ may,
in his discretion, award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party.106 And if the losing party appeals to the Court of Appeals and
loses, the appellate court also can award reasonable attorneys'
fees. 07 To be successful, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the employer intentionally discriminated against
a protected party.108 If two applicants are equally qualified, an em-
ployer can prefer to hire a citizen over an authorized noncitizen and
will not be liable.109 This provision, which is highly subjective, allows
employers to escape liability under the Frank Amendment.
The criteria for bringing an action under the Frank Amendment
97. Id.
98. Id., 100 Stat. at 3374-75.
99. Id., 100 Stat. at 3376.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id., 100 Stat. at 3377-78.
103. Id., 100 Stat. at 3378.
104. Id.
105. Id. However, any amounts earned by plaintiffs must be used to reduce the
back pay award. Id.
106. IRCA § 102(a), 100 Stat. at 3378 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b).
107. Id., 100 Stat. at 3379.
108. 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 378 (1987).
109. IRCA § 102(a), 100 Stat. at 3375 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b).
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will make it difficult for plaintiffs to establish claims in this area.
Nevertheless, there are certain employment practices that clearly vi-
olate the Frank Amendment. One example is when an employer ref-
uses to accept any of the documents listed as possible proof of identi-
fication and/or work authorization, but instead insists on only one,
such as a passport, before hiring. 10
Because this law is so new, it is difficult to determine whether the
courts will strictly follow the procedure and guidelines thus far es-
tablished. One case recently decided in this area, League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Pasadena Independent School Dis-
trict,"' does not closely adhere to the guidelines. In League of
United Latin American Citizens, an employer fired four undocu-
mented aliens upon learning they had used false Social Security
numbers to obtain employment. In a class action, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that because ninety percent of the workers were Hispanics and
that undocumented Hispanic aliens generally use false Social Secur-
ity numbers, the policy of firing workers who had given false Social
Security numbers would have a disparate impact on Hispanics." 2
The court granted a temporary injunction on behalf of the plain-
tiffs. The court noted that the employer had failed to warn appli-
cants that they could be dismissed for submitting false information
on their applications, and further had failed to investigate the infor-
mation on the application in a timely manner."13 The court was con-
cerned that employees who came forward and revealed their unlaw-
ful status to qualify for amnesty and lawful status under IRCA
might risk losing their jobs if employers were permitted to dismiss
them for providing false information." 4 Finally, the court deter-
mined that the plaintiffs likely would prevail on a Frank Amendment
cause of action." 5 This holding is inconsistent with the prerequisites
of the Frank Amendment. There was no indication that the firing
policy was intended to discriminate against Hispanic citizens or au-
thorized aliens. Indeed, the persons who were fired were not entitled
to the protection of the Frank Amendment."' Because this case did
110. 133 CONG. REC. S7000 (daily ed. May 21, 1987), reprinted in 64 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 629 (1987).
111. 662 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
112. Id. at 445-46.
113. Id. at 445.
114. Id. at 449.
115. Id. at 451.
116. No member of the class had filed a declaration of intention to become a
United States citizen as required by the Frank Amendment. IRCA § 102(a), 100 Stat.
at 3374 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b). Further, the proper procedure is to file a claim
not deal with the Frank Amendment in depth, and because it fo-
cused on temporary relief in a transitional situation, it may have lit-
tle precedential value once the amnesty deadlines have passed. Still,
at the very least, the case demonstrates that courts will be tempted
to stretch the Frank Amendment to protect against discrimination.
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS ANTIDISCRIMINATION
PROTECTIONS
Prior to IRCA, title VII and section 1981 were the only protec-
tions against citizenship and national origin discrimination. Title VII
generally protected against national origin discrimination, while sec-
tion 1981 protected national origin groups that qualified as "races,"
and sometimes provided for relief to victims of pure citizenship dis-
crimination. However, gaps in coverage existed. Employers with less
than fifteen employees could discriminate against national origin
groups that did not qualify as "races,"' 1 7 and employers who dis-
criminated solely on the basis of citizenship faced a steadily decreas-
ing risk that they would be found liable under section 1981.
With the strong economic pressure exerted on employers to dis-
criminate on the basis of national origin and/or citizenship, protec-
tions in addition to title VII and section 1981 were urgently needed.
The questions now are: (1) Whether the Frank Amendment provides
appropriate protection; and (2) How the Frank Amendment and the
existing protections of title VII and section 1981 will work together.
The Frank Amendment provides some protection against pure citi-
zenship discrimination against aliens who have filed a declaration of
intent to become citizens and are on schedule to become naturalized
citizens. Applicants who have been discriminated against by employ-
ers with between four and fourteen employees also are protected if
they are citizens or qualify under the noncitizen requirements.1 18
Discrimination against authorized aliens who have not filed decla-
rations or proceeded with naturalization presents a more difficult
question. Judges will be faced with a difficult choice - either dis-
miss an otherwise valid claim or stretch the rules to allow the claim
to continue. There are two possible ways to remedy this situation.
First, a procedure for yearly evaluation and modification of the pro-
tections does exist."x 9 However, this is a time-consuming process that
with the EEOC or Special Counsel, not to bring an action in federal court. Id., 100 Stat.
at 3374-75. Here, however, the court granted the injunction even though the Frank
Amendment does not specifically provide for injunctive relief. League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Pasadena Indep. School Dist., 662 F. Supp. at 451.
117. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
119. The Comptroller of the General Accounting Office will prepare annual re-
ports for the first three years, evaluating the effectiveness of IRCA, including its antidis-
crimination provisions. IRCA § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3370 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
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will do nothing to provide guidance for those first cases considering
this issue. The second remedy is to use the broad language of section
1981 and the precedent of Guerra to extend some protection to au-
thorized aliens. Whether judges will do so probably will depend on
the number and circumstances of such claims.
An individual with a valid claim against an employer with fifteen
or more employees would have a claim under both the Frank
Amendment and title VII. However, the individual cannot maintain
both; he or she must choose one and proceed only on that claim.
120
Whichever claim is chosen will be processed by the EEOC. 121 When
the claim involves employers with four to fourteen employees, the
Special Counsel will process Frank Amendment claims by author-
ized and qualifying noncitizens and citizens.
Before the Frank Amendment, members of a national origin group
that qualified as a "race," like Hispanics, could bring claims under
both title VII and section 1981. The two questions that arise are (1)
whether section 1981 will continue to be a possible remedy; and (2)
if so, how can it coexist with the procedure required by the Special
Counsel?
The Frank Amendment explicitly provides that the EEOC and ti-
tle VII will continue to operate, 22 but says nothing about section
1981. Whether that omission was intentional or not is unclear. Sec-
tion 1981 was resurrected as a remedy against employment discrimi-
nation to help fill the gaps left by title VII. Theoretically, the Frank
Amendment does this. If that is so, perhaps section 1981 no longer is
needed and should not be available as an additional remedy.
However, there are good arguments for continuing to recognize
section 1981 claims in some areas of employment hiring discrimina-
tion. One role it can play is to plug gaps left by the Frank Amend-
ment. For example, discrimination against authorized aliens who did
not file a declaration of intent to become a citizen is not protected
against by the Frank Amendment.12 a If large numbers of authorized
aliens are discriminated against, but barred from recovery because
1324a). A task force consisting of the Attorney General, Chairman of the Commission
on Civil Rights and the Chairman of the EEOC will review and make recommendations
to Congress. Id. The appropriate Congressional committees must then hold hearings
within 60 days of receiving the recommendations. Id. Note, however, that Congress is
under no obligation to follow these recommendations.
120. IRCA § 102(a), 100 Stat. at 3375 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b).
121. Id.
122. See id.; see also id. § 102(b), 100 Stat. at 3379 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1324b).
123. See supra note 116.
of the little known prerequisite of having previously filed the declara-
tion, courts might choose to save these claims by allowing a section
1981 claim. 24
If section 1981 does survive as a valid claim in at least some situa-
tions, how can it coexist with the procedural requirements of the
Frank Amendment? Section 1981 and title VII claims have coex-
isted, but the procedural problems have been minimal because both
actions must be brought in federal court. The Frank Amendment
requires action to be brought before an ALJ. 25 Clearly, a section
1981 claim still would have to be brought in federal court.
Beyond that, the larger question must be addressed of why Con-
gress would put strict guidelines and procedures on the Frank
Amendment if Congress intended section 1981 to continue to provide
some relief for some of the claims also covered by the Frank Amend-
ment. Possibly Congress either did not anticipate or did not intend
for section 1981 to continue as a separate and additional relief for
the discriminations covered by the Frank Amendment. However, the
legislative history of the bill shows that Congress was aware of the
possible overlap of the Frank Amendment with section 198 1.126 Also,
the fact that section 1981 claims have been well-known and well-
established indicates that if Congress had intended to restrict this
overlap, they would have or should have explicitly said so in the bill
or legislative history.
CONCLUSION
In the face of a potential onslaught of citizenship and national
origin discrimination claims, the Frank Amendment of IRCA was
enacted to fill the gaps uncovered by the antidiscrimination provi-
sions of title VII and section 1981. Although the various antidis-
crimination measures overlap in places and do not address certain
other areas, they can provide the necessary discrimination protection.
Therefore, claims of national origin and citizenship discrimination
should be handled by either the Frank Amendment or title VII. To
the extent that these measures in themselves prove ineffective in ad-
dressing legitimate discrimination complaints in these areas, section
1981 should be used to fill those gaps.
Authorized aliens and United States citizens of minority national
origin have a clear interest in a complete and available remedy to
counter possible discrimination from IRCA. Even proponents of im-
migration control and IRCA have reason to support a judicial imple-
124. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
126. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5649, 5752.
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mentation of the Frank Amendment that provides proper protection
against discrimination. 27 Therefore, it is in the best interest of all
concerned that future courts use section 1981 in conjunction with the
Frank Amendment and title VII to assure that all who encounter
hiring discrimination as a result of IRCA have an adequate remedy.
RICHARD MAGALSKI
127. The Comptroller General of the United States will prepare an annual report
through 1990 that will examine, in part, whether IRCA has resulted in a pattern of
improper discrimination. IRCA § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3370 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1324a). If the Comptroller General finds a widespread pattern of discrimination and
Congress enacts a joint resolution approving the substance of his findings, the employer
sanctions will be terminated within 30 days of receipt of the last report. Id. Therefore,
proponents of IRCA and its sanctions have a strong interest in seeing that the victims of
IRCA discrimination have a proper and adequate remedy available to them.

